Optimal New Energy Vehicle Production Strategy Considering Subsidy and Shortage Cost  by Zhang, Xiang & Zhang, Chunye
1876-6102 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Applied Energy Innovation Institute
doi: 10.1016/j.egypro.2015.07.605 
 Energy Procedia  75 ( 2015 )  2981 – 2986 
ScienceDirect
The 7th International Conference on Applied Energy – ICAE2015 
Optimal New Energy Vehicle Production Strategy 
Considering Subsidy and Shortage Cost  
Xiang Zhang 1,2*, Chunye Zhang1  
1. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China  
2. Centre for Energy & Environmental Policy Research, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China 
Abstract 
In this paper, we present an analytical model to investigate how the optimal production strategy of new energy 
vehicles (NEVs) is influenced by subsidy, market fluctuation, and loss aversion. We find that a loss averse decision 
maker may produce more production quantity than the optimal quantity in risk neutrality under the certain conditions. 
We demonstrate that the expected utility is substantially influenced by subsidy, loss aversion, and the shortage cost. 
Although the relationship between subsidy and loss aversion is not straightforward when considering shortage cost, 
subsidy may play a role to regulate the possible overages and shortages in NEV manufacturing. Implications to both 
policy makers and practitioners are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
The market for new energy vehicle (NEV) in China becomes booming. NEV refers to electric vehicle, 
fuel cell battery vehicle, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicle. In the first ten months of 2014, a total of 
46,935 NEVs have been produced[1]. And a total of 38,163 NEVs have been sold in the first nine 
months[2], surging by 2.8 times compared to the total sales volume in the same period of 2013. A series of 
major factors contribute to the NEV market growth, including the extension of the subsidy program for 
NEV manufacturers with a gradual reduction beyond 2015, the purchase tax exemption for consumers, 
more NEV models and types available on the market, the restrictions on fuel oil vehicles, and the 
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advancement of technology (such as the increased battery capacity with a greater cruising range etc.), to 
name a few.  
The recent surge in NEV demand reminds the managers to consider the possible influence of stockout 
problem. In fact, the media has already reported the battery supply shortage which in turn causes the 
shortage of NEV supply[3]. In addition to the market fluctuation, managers of NEV manufacturer have to 
consider a number of other influential factors when making production decision, including subsidy and 
decision bias. On one side, subsidy drives down the relatively high selling price to make the NEV more 
economically competitive. On the other side, the manager’s decision making behavior is governed by 
human behavioral and psychological rules, such as loss aversion[4][5][6][7][8][9], which may cause decision 
bias. The decision bias further complicates the decision process as it brings another uncertainty when 
predicting the influences of government incentives on promoting NEV production and adoption.  
In this paper, we investigate the loss averse NEV manager’s decision making process with overage risk, 
underage risk, and subsidy. The analytical work is based on the loss averse newsvendor model (see [10] 
and [11] for reviews of the risk neutral newsvendor model). Due to the different research focuses, 
previous studies on loss averse newsvendor model assume that the unsatisfied demand is lost, see for 
example [12][13][14][15]. In this paper, we show how the shortage cost substantially influences on the 
manager’s optimal quantity and the effect of subsidy. We also reveal the interaction mechanism among 
subsidy, loss aversion, the optimal production quantity, and the expected utility. In the following, we 
present the analytical model with shortage cost in Section 2. In Section 3, we derive the optimal solution 
and the relevant properties of the proposed model. We discuss the results and make concluding remarks in 
Section 4. 
2. The analytical model 
     Consider a situation where a manager of a NEV manufacturer facing stochastic demand, x, with the 
probability density function f(x) and the cumulative distribution function F(x). The manager has to decide 
how many NEVs to produce well in advance before the selling season starts. Let p be the per unit selling 
price of the product, c the per unit production cost, s the per unit salvage value, and g the per unit 
goodwill cost due to shortage, s > 0, g > 0. Let Y be subsidy to NEV manufacturer, Y > 0. Following [9], 
we assume the NEV manager knows that his company receives the per unit subsidy Y for the realized 
demand, indicating that each product has a higher per unit revenue (p + Y). Different from [9], we 
incorporate the shortage cost here. The profit function ʌ(Q, x) can be written as follows: 
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From the profit function (1), the manager knows that there are two breakeven points.  Let qo and qs be 
the breakeven quantities corresponding to the overage and the shortage cases, respectively. The qo and qs 
can be written in the following manners:  
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When the demand is less than qo or more than qs, the manager knows that the profit is below the 
relevant breakeven points, and hence is negative. According to loss aversion theory[4][6], the manager in 
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this case is more sensitive to the losses than the equivalent gains (or profits) with the breakeven points as 
reference point. Let Ȝ be the loss aversion coefficient, Ȝ > 1. Let EU[ʌ(Q, x)] and EU(ʌȜs) be the risk 
neutral and the loss averse decision maker’s expected utility, respectively. Using the breakeven points 
ʌ1(qo) = ʌ2(qs) = 0 as the reference point, the model to maximize the loss averse manager’s expected 
utility can be written in the following manner: 
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As shown in Eq.(4), the two breakeven points, i.e. the overage breakeven point and the underage 
breakeven point, are served as the reference point. If g = 0, Eq.(4) reduces to the loss averse newsvendor 
model without the shortage cost. If Ȝ = 1, the last two parts in Eq.(4) are zero, which means there is no 
reference dependence and the model (4) reduces to the standard subsidized newsvendor model.  
3. The properties of the model 
     In this section, we present the properties of the model regarding the optimal quantity, the maximum 
expected utility, and the effects of subsidy on NEV production.  
Proposition 1. Eq. (4) is concave in Q and there exists a unique optimal solution as shown in the 
following Eq. (5).  
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Proof of Proposition 1 
Taking the first and second derivatives of EU(ʌȜs) with respect to Q in Eq.(4), respectively, we have: 
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Q
ʌEU sȜ , Eq.(4) is concave in Q. Using the first order condition, we can derive the loss 
averse manager’s optimal production quantity, as shown in Eq.(5).  
Q.E.D. 
 
 Proposition 2. Define ʌloss = (p + Y + g – c)F(qs) + (c – s)F(qo).  
(1) The optimal production quantity QOs* is increasing in the shortage cost g and subsidy Y. 
(2) If (p + Y + g – c) > ʌloss, the optimal production quantity QOs* is increasing in the loss aversion 
coefficient Ȝ and is more than the optimal quantity *Q  in risk neutrality, i.e., 0* !ww OOsQ  and ** QQ s !O . 
Otherwise, QOs* is decreasing in Ȝ and is less than the optimal quantity in risk neutrality. 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
For 2(1), taking the partial derivative of Q with respect to g, we have: 
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Similarly, taking the partial derivative of Q with respect to Y, we have: 
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For 2(2), taking the partial derivative of Q with respect to Ȝ, we have: 
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Note that the above denominator is positive. If  > @    )())((1 QqFscQqFcgYp os  >0, then 
0!ww OOsQ . Since Q
* maximizes the profit in risk neutrality (i.e., O = 1), it follows that ** QQ s !O . After 
rearranging the inequity, we have the results as stipulated in Proposition 2(2).  
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2 reveals that both subsidy and the shortage cost play positive roles to stimulate more 
production quantity. An interesting result is that, under the certain condition, a loss averse manager will 
produce more products than an optimal quantity in risk neutrality, as evidenced by ** QQ s !O . This is in 
contrast to conventional result that a loss averse manager always produce less if shortage cost is not 
considered.  
Let )( *ȜʌEU  be the loss averse manager’s optimal expected utility without considering the shortage 
cost. We have the following proposition regarding the expected utilities.    
Proposition 3. (1) )( *sEU OS  is decreasing in g. 
(2) )( *sEU OS  is increasing in Y. 
(3) )()()( *** SSS OO EUEUEU s  . 
Proof of Proposition 3 
     For 3(1) and 3(2), the optimal expected utility can be written as follows: 
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Taking the first derivative of )( *sȜʌEU  with respect to g and Y, we obtain 
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For 3(3), because the optimal quantity Q* in the standard model with subsidies is unique, any other 
order Q Į Q* will decrease the utility. Hence )()( ** SSO EUEU  . According to Proposition 3(1), the 
expected utility decreases in g. Therefore )( *sEU OS  is less than )(
*
OSEU (where g = 0), i.e., 
)()( ** OO SS EUEU s  . 
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Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 4. (1) qo is decreasing in Y; qs is increasing in Y.  
                         (2) If (p + Y + g – c) > ʌloss, then Y/Ȝ < 0. Otherwise, Y/Ȝ > 0. 
                  (3) Y/s < 0. 
                  (4) Y/g < 0. 
Proof of proposition 4. 
     For 4(1), the proof is straightforward. Because Y is in the denominator in Eq.(2), the larger the Y is, the 
smaller the qo will be. Similarly, Y is in the numerator in Eq.(3), the larger the Y is, the greater the qs will 
be. 
 For 4(2), taking the partial derivative of Y with respect to Ȝ, we have: 
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     If (p + Y + g – c) > ʌloss, Y/Ȝ < 0. Otherwise, Y/Ȝ > 0. 
Similarly, for 4(3), taking the partial derivative of Y with respect to s, we have: 
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     For 4(4), taking the partial derivative of Y with respect to g, we have: 
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Proposition 4 reveals several implications for policy makers. As shown in Proposition 4(1), subsidy 
helps decrease the entrance requirement of NEV production by lowering the startup breakeven quantity. 
Subsidy also helps reduce the stockout risk by increasing the breakeven quantity of shortage. However, 
the interactions between subsidy and loss aversion is not straightforward when considering the shortage 
cost, as demonstrated by Proposition 4(2). The increase or decrease of subsidy depends on the trade-off 
between (p + Y + g – c) and ʌloss. Proposition 4(3) and 4(4) show subsidy is decreasing in both the salvage 
value and the stockout cost. It may imply that subsidy can be used as the lever to regulate the possible 
overages as well as shortages.   
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we present an analytical model to investigate how the optimal NEV production strategy 
is influenced by subsidy, overage risk, underage risk, and loss aversion. We find that a loss averse 
decision maker may produce more production quantity than the optimal quantity in risk neutrality under 
the certain conditions. We demonstrate that the expected utility is substantially influenced by subsidy, 
loss aversion, and the shortage cost. Although the relationship between subsidy and loss aversion is not 
straightforward when considering shortage cost, subsidy may play a role to regulate the possible overages 
and shortages in NEV manufacturing.   
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